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Equity Offerings by Firms That
Emerged from Bankruptcy
Surendranath Jory*
University of Michigan – Flint
and
Jeff Madura**
Florida Atlantic University
Entrepreneurship is not only used to create a business idea, but also to restructure a
business in response to environmental conditions. Firms that issue equity after emerging from
bankruptcy are unique in that they exhibit less asymmetric information than other firms that
issue equity. They were previously subject to the SEC disclosure requirements when they had
publicly-traded securities, and were required to disclose information about their assets,
liabilities, and governance while operating under Chapter 11 bankruptcy laws. Our analysis
determines that the mean underpricing of the firms that engaged in public stock offerings after
emerging from bankruptcy is 4.49 percent, while the mean underpricing for the traditional IPOs
is 15.53 percent. A multivariate analysis reinforces the lower degree of underpricing of public
offerings by firms that emerged from bankruptcy, while controlling for other characteristics
that could affect the level of underpricing. We also find that the aftermarket stock price
performance of the firms that emerged from bankruptcy is more favorable than that of
traditional IPOs. All results are attributed to a lower degree of asymmetric information
associated with public stock offerings by firms that emerge from bankruptcy.
Introduction
When a firm reorganizes under Chapter 11 bankruptcy, stockholders are commonly left
with no equity; the company‟s liabilities are restructured, some creditors receive new equity;
and some of the company‟s assets may have been sold. The reorganized company is under the
control of new owners, directors and management. Entrepreneurship is required to restructure a
new business plan, which must include a strategy to finance the business that emerges from
bankruptcy. After emerging from bankruptcy, the firm may undertake an equity offering to
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raise capital for investment and financing purposes and to create a market in which the new
owners can convert their shareholdings into cash. Such an equity offering is a special type of
initial public offering (IPO).
Post-bankruptcy equity offerings are distinctly different from traditional IPOs. They
typically represent a reentry into the stock market. Many bankrupt firms had at one time
publicly traded securities and were subject to SEC disclosure requirements. Hence, there is
likely to be substantially more information available to investors to assess the expected market
value of these firms upon their subsequent return to public ownership. Second, the dynamics of
U.S. bankruptcy proceedings provide information to the public regarding assets, liabilities,
governance and internal controls of the firm emerging from bankruptcy.
These firms have more transparency, so that their public offerings should be subject to a
smaller degree of asymmetric information than the traditional IPOs. Since underpricing is
commonly attributed to asymmetric information, firms emerging from bankruptcy that engage
in public offerings should exhibit less underpricing. To the extent that these firms experience a
more limited jump in stock price on the offer date, they are less susceptible to a long-term
downward drift in price over time. Our goal is to assess the underpricing and long-term stock
price performance of firms that engage in public stock offerings after emerging from
bankruptcy. We find that underpricing is less pronounced in post-bankruptcy equity offerings
than in traditional IPOs. In addition, these equity offering do not exhibit any reversal in returns
in the long-run.
Information During the Bankruptcy Reorganization Process
Once a company files for bankruptcy, it is also engaged in an information dissemination
process. Upon entering bankruptcy, it must file a written disclosure statement and a plan of
reorganization with the bankruptcy court. The disclosure statement is a document that contains
information regarding the assets, liabilities and business affairs of the company, so that
creditors can make an informed judgment about the plan of reorganization.1 The plan should
divulge all of the company‟s liabilities and how they are restructured. While operating under
Chapter 11 bankruptcy, firms are required to make extensive, regular disclosures of their
financial and operating data to the court. Additional information is contained in the court
testimony of expert witnesses, management and creditors (see Gilson, John and Lang (1990)
for more details).
At the end of the bankruptcy process, information on the firm‟s value is confirmed
through the reorganization plan. Media releases, the disclosure statement, the regular accounts
of financial and operating data and the plan of reorganization constitute a unique set of
information about the bankrupt company that is available to the public to determine the net
worth of the company upon its emergence from bankruptcy. Also, given that a bankruptcy
judge presides over the administration of a bankruptcy case and that the U.S. bankruptcy
system requires transparency and accountability; the credibility of the information revealed
during the bankruptcy process is further enhanced. For this reason, the extent of information
asymmetry that may exist between the company and the market is low.
IPO Underpricing
IPO underpricing has averaged 19 percent over time (see Ritter and Welch (2002)).
Various reasons for underpricing have been offered, such as to signal good quality (Allen and
Falhauber (1989)), to develop a reputation among investors (Ritter and Welch (2002)), to
1
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solicit information from investors about potential interest (Benveniste and Spindt (1989),
Sherman and Titman (2002)), to facilitate marketing (Habib and Ljungqvist (2001)), to avoid
future lawsuit from investors (Tinic (1988), Hughes and Thakor (1992)), and to motivate the
underwriter (Baron (1982)). Most of these reasons and their justifications are based on the
existence of some type of asymmetric information in the IPO process. Asymmetric information
leads to ex ante uncertainty about the true value of the firm.
Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1989) test the asymmetric information hypothesis and the
underpricing of IPOs by comparing a sample of IPOs that previously underwent a leveraged
buyout (LBO) with a control sample of non-LBO IPOs. They argue that the uncertainty about
the value of the LBOs should be substantially reduced because of the availability of public
information before the IPO. Using a sample of LBOs and a control sample of non-LBO IPOs,
they find average underpricing of 2.04% for the LBOs and 7.97% for the control sample. In
another related study, Ang and Brau (2002) show that firms going public that are more
transparent incur lower issuance costs. In their study, the size- and date-matched control sample
consisting of non-LBO firm-commitment IPOs displays greater underpricing than does their
LBO sample, 8.04% vs. 5.47%. Results of these two studies suggest that IPOs by firms that
were previously publicly traded are less underpriced than other IPOs.
II.

Hypotheses
Because post-bankruptcy offerings are unique, they may exhibit pricing characteristics
that differ from traditional IPOs.
A.
Hypothesis About Underpricing
Like LBO firms, the firms that filed for Chapter 11 were once publicly traded, and this
type of information should increase transparency. These firms were required to disclose
information in the bankruptcy reorganization process, we hypothesize that they exhibit a lower
degree of underpricing than traditional IPOs.
However, we consider a counter hypothesis. When firms reorganize, their previous
business operations may have been altered, as their reorganization is finalized. This could
create more uncertainty about their future performance. In addition, a previous bankruptcy may
create some suspicion in the minds of investors, which could add to the uncertainty. Some
investors may require that the price of equity of a bankrupt firm be discounted more to
compensate for concerns due to its previous performance as a public company. These forces
allow for the possibility of a greater degree of underpricing in post-bankruptcy offerings than in
traditional IPOs.
B.
Hypothesis About Long-run Stock Price Performance
In general, studies have found weak stock price performance following public stock
offerings (see, for example, Ritter (1991), Loughran and Ritter (1995), and Spiess and AffleckGraves (1995)). They explain underperformance in terms of investor sentiment that causes
excessive optimism in the initial stage of the offering. Once the sentiment wears off, returns
decline to a sustainable equilibrium, and stocks consequently underperform. In essence, the
poor performance can be attributed to a misinterpretation about the signal of a public offering
by firms that performed well prior to the offering.
Since bankrupt firms exhibit poor performance prior to their equity offerings, the
possibility of the usual overexcitement found in traditional IPOs may be absent. In addition, the
additional information about bankrupt firms may increase transparency and prevent the hype
that is associated with some traditional IPOs. Just as there may be less underpricing because of
less uncertainty surrounding the price, there should be less chance that the market will be
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overly optimistic about the post-bankruptcy offering. Therefore, we hypothesize that there will
be a smaller correction (if at all) following post-bankruptcy offerings.
III.

Data and Methodology
To test our hypotheses, we compile a data base of post-bankruptcy offerings and a
control sample of matched traditional IPOs, and apply tests of underpricing and long-term share
price performance.
A.
Data
The sample consists of equity offerings by firms that filed for and emerged from
bankruptcy during the period 1985 to 2006. The primary source of information on firms
emerging from bankruptcy is Lynn M. LoPucki‟s Bankruptcy Research Database. It is a
business bankruptcy research tool on the web maintained by Professor Lynn M. LoPucki of
University of California, Los Angeles Law School. This database includes all Chapter 11
bankruptcy cases filed by or against a company, since 1980, such that the company (1) has
assets worth $100 million or more at the time of filing, measured in 1980 dollars, and (2) is
required to file 10-Ks with the SEC. The data are gathered from a variety of sources, the most
important of which are the bankruptcy courts‟ files (on PACER (Public Access to Court
Electronic Records) service, which provides the full-text source for bankruptcy documents) and
the bankrupt company‟s filings with the SEC.
The Securities Data Corporation (SDC) Platinum Global New Issues Database provides
information regarding equity offerings by bankrupt firms on or after their respective emergence
date. To be included in the sample, a firm must have price and return data in the University of
Chicago‟s Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) post-emergence. Our sample consists
of 66 firms that conducted a public offering after emerging from bankruptcy.
B.
Methodology for Testing Underpricing
Underpricing is defined as the offer-to-close return, which is calculated as the
percentage difference between the offer price and the first-day closing price (Pt):
Offer-to-close return = (Offer Price – Pt)/Offer Price

(1)

C.
Multivariate Tests of Underpricing
To further test whether post-bankruptcy equity offerings are less underpriced than
traditional IPOs, we use multivariate analysis. The sample includes the post-bankruptcy equity
offerings and the sample of matched traditional IPOs. A matched traditional IPO is in the same
year as its corresponding sample firm and is in the same industry and closest in size to the
sample firm
The dependent variable is the amount of underpricing. The independent variable of
interest to test our underpricing hypothesis is BANKRUPT, a dummy variable that takes a value
of 1 if the equity offering is post-bankruptcy, and a value of 0 for traditional IPOs. We expect
that the BANKRUPT dummy variable should be negative, which reflects less underpricing for
post-bankruptcy IPOs than traditional IPOs.
We also control for other characteristics that may affect the underpricing based on
studies by Hogan, Olson and Kish (2001) and Lowry and Schwert (2002):
i.

OVERPCT is the over-allotment amount sold as a percentage of the deal value. We
predict a positive relationship between OVERPCT and underpricing, consistent with the
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hypothesis that investment bankers use the over-allotment option to put upward
pressure on initial returns to build and maintain good relationships with investors
(Carter and Dark (1991)).
ii. NMGR is the number of firms participating in the underwriting process of the issue. As
explained in Hogan, Olson and Kish (2001) a larger number of firms in the
underwriting process may result in more information to be conveyed to potential
investors. With more information available, the issue is scrutinized to a greater degree
and the need for underpricing is lower. Hence, we predict an inverse relationship
between NMGR and underpricing.
iii. ∆P is the percentage change between the middle of the initial estimated price range and
the offer price. In an IPO, adjustment is made to the offering price when new
information is discovered (see Benveniste and Spindt (1989)) and underpricing rewards
investors for providing information during road shows. Hanley (1993) documents that
the difference between the final offer price of an IPO and the initial filing range is
positively related to the stock‟s subsequent initial return. Hence, we predict a positive
relationship between the percentage change from initial price to offer price and
underpricing.
iv.
HOT is a binary variable equal to 1 if the issue occurs between January 1999 and
December 2000 and 0 otherwise. Our sample period covers the internet bubble period;
hence, we incorporate an internet bubble dummy to control for market overvaluation
and timing. We define the “hot” period consistent with Ljungqvist and Wilhem (2003),
and expect that underpricing is higher during this time period.
The multivariate model is as follows:

UNDERPRICINGi    1 BANKRUPTi   2 OVERPCTi   3 NMGRi   4 Pi   5 HOTi   i (2)
D.
Methodology for Testing Long-run Share Price Performance
Barber and Lyon (1997) calculate buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) to estimate
long-run abnormal returns. A BHAR is measured as the holding period return on the sample
firm less the holding period return on a comparable asset or portfolio. We compute the BHARs
over several intervals up to 36 months following the equity offering, and use two benchmarks
in calculating BHARs: (i) an industry-and-size matched sample of non-equity-issuing firms,
and (ii) a size-and-book-to-market matched sample of non-equity-issuing firms.
An industry-and-size matching firm is a firm with the same four-digit SIC code and
with the market capitalization closest to that of the sample firm, using the closing market
capitalization on the first day of trading for the equity offering firm, and the market
capitalization at the end of the previous year for the matching firm. If a matched firm with the
same four-digit SIC code is not available, the firm with the same three-digit SIC code, and with
the market capitalization closest to that of the sample firm is chosen. A size- and book-tomarket matching firm is a firm with a market capitalization within 30 percent of the market
capitalization of the equity offering firm and closest in book-to-market ratio. Firms with a
market capitalization greater than or less than 30 percent of the market capitalization of the
post-bankruptcy equity offering firm are not considered as matching firms.
We also use the three-factor model developed by Fama and French (1993) to calculate
long-run abnormal returns. The three-factor model is applied by regressing the post-event daily
excess returns of the equity offering firms on a market factor, a size factor, and a book-tomarket factor as follows:
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Rit – Rft = αi + βi(Rmt – Rft) + siSMBt + hiHMLt + εit

(3)

where, Rit is the daily return on the common stock of firm i, Rft is the return on three-month
Treasury Bills, Rmt is the return on a value-weighted market index, SMBt is the return on a
value-weighted portfolio of small stocks less the return on a value-weighted portfolio of large
stocks, and HMLt is the return on a value-weighted portfolio of high book-to-market stocks less
the return on a value-weighted portfolio of low book-to-market stocks. The intercept represents
the mean abnormal return in the event period. We test whether the intercept term is zero in
order to determine whether the abnormal return is significant.
IV.

Results
A.
Descriptive Statistics
In Panel A of Table I, we show the breakdown of post-bankruptcy equity offerings by
year. The largest number of post-bankruptcy equity offerings occur in year 2004 followed by
years 1996 and 2005. The years 2003, 2004 and 2005 comprise 40 percent of the total sample
of post-bankruptcy equity offerings. Only 3 percent of the offerings occur during the hot IPO
period.
In Panel B of Table I, we show the distribution of post-bankruptcy equity offerings by
stock exchange. Fifty-eight percent of post-bankruptcy equity offerings are made by NYSElisted firms; 35 percent are made by NASDAQ-listed firms; and, only 8 percent of the offerings
are made by AMEX-listed firms.
In Panel C of Table I, we show the use of proceeds from the post-bankruptcy equity
offerings. The most common cited reason is general corporate use, which represents 29 percent
of the sample. The second most-cited reason is secondary uses, which represents 23 percent of
the sample. Other reasons included acquisition financing as the main use of proceeds,
repayment of debt, and working capital needs. Fourteen percent of the sample firms do not
mention their planned use of proceeds.
In Panel D of Table I, we show the occurrence of post-bankruptcy equity offerings by
industry. The highest number of such offerings is made by air transportation companies.
Previously bankrupt companies in the oil and gas industry have the second highest number of
equity offerings post-bankruptcy.
In Panel E of Table I, we show the lead managers who are involved in the postbankruptcy equity offerings. Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch and Salomon Brothers are the most
involved with 15, 14 and 13 percent of the offerings, respectively.
Panel F of Table I shows that 73 percent of the post-bankruptcy equity offerings are
syndicated. Panel G of Table I shows that in 42 percent of the offerings, there are no lock-up
provisions.
In Table II, we report summary statistics of various characteristics for the sample of 66
post-bankruptcy equity offerings. The mean time spent in Chapter 11 bankruptcy by the sample
firms is 1.75 years and the median is 1.41 years. The mean time period between emergence
from Chapter 11 bankruptcy to equity offering is 3.48 years with the median equaling 2.20
years. The mean and median offer prices are $18.97 and $16.38, respectively. The average total
proceeds from post-bankruptcy equity offerings is $151.47 million and the median is $105.95
million. The mean over-allotment amount sold as a percentage of the total amount offered is
7.89 percent while the median is 9.39 percent. The mean and median number of lead, co-lead
and co-managers involved in post-bankruptcy equity offerings are both equal to 3. The mean
change in mid-file price to offer price is 4 percent while the median is -2 percent. The mean
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and median gross spreads are both close to 5 percent. The mean and median lead underwriters‟
ratings are both equal to 9.
B.
Underpricing
In Table III, we present the results for underpricing of post-bankruptcy equity offerings.
Underpricing is measured as the difference between the offer price and the closing price at the
end of the offer day. The mean underpricing is 4.49 percent and is significantly different from
zero at the 1 percent level. The median underpricing is 1.74 percent. Using both the sign test
and the Wilcoxon signed rank test, we conclude that the underpricing is significant. Both tests
are the non-parametric versions of the t-test.
To test our hypothesis that underpricing is lower for IPOs by firms that emerged from
bankruptcy, we compare post-bankruptcy equity offerings with traditional IPOs matched on
offer year and industry. In a second analysis, we compare post-bankruptcy equity offerings to
traditional IPOs matched on offer year and the size of the issue. The results are presented in
Table IV.
In Panel A of Table IV, we compare the underpricing of post-bankruptcy equity
offerings with traditional IPOs. A matching traditional IPO is conducted in the same year as the
post-bankruptcy equity offering and in the same industry. If there is more than one match in the
same industry, we select the one that is closest in size as the matching firm. The mean
underpricing for the traditional IPOs is 15.53 percent compared to 4.49 percent for the sample
of post-bankruptcy equity offerings. This difference in underpricing is statistically significant at
the 1 percent level.
In Panel B of Table IV, we compare the underpricing of post-bankruptcy equity
offerings with a second set of traditional IPOs. The matching traditional IPO is conducted in
the same year as the post-bankruptcy equity offering and is closest in issue size to the postbankruptcy equity offering. The mean underpricing for the traditional IPOs is 15.80 percent
compared to 4.49 percent for the sample of post-bankruptcy equity offerings. This difference in
underpricing is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The results in Tables III and IV
support the hypothesis that the underpricing of post-bankruptcy equity offerings is lower than
the underpricing of traditional IPOs.
C.
Multivariate Analysis of Underpricing
To test whether post-bankruptcy equity offerings are less underpriced than traditional
IPOs while controlling for other factors, we use multivariate analysis. The analysis is applied to
the pooled samples containing the post-bankruptcy equity offerings and the matched traditional
IPOs. A matched traditional IPO is a matching firm that engaged in an IPO in the same year as
its corresponding sample firm and is either in the same industry or closest in size to the sample
firm.
The dependent variable in the multivariate analysis is the amount of the underpricing.
Results are presented in Table V. The coefficient of the variable BANKRUPT is negative and
significant at the .01 level. This result supports the hypothesis that post-bankruptcy equity
offerings are less underpriced than traditional IPOs. We attribute this result to less information
asymmetry with a post-bankruptcy equity offering. In contrast to traditional IPOs, which are
completely new to the market, post-bankruptcy equity offerings are conducted by firms that
were once publicly traded. In addition, bankruptcy proceedings provide key information (in the
form of media-releases, disclosure statement, regular accounts of financial and operating data,
and a plan of reorganization) to the investing public to reevaluate the firm‟s potential. Hence,
more information is available about post-bankruptcy equity offerings compared to traditional
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IPOs. This lower level of information asymmetry results in a lower level of underpricing for
post-bankruptcy equity offerings.
There also exists a negative relationship between underpricing and the number of firms
participating in the underwriting process. As explained in Hogan, Olson and Kish (2001), as the
number of firms participating in the underwriting process increases, there is the potential for
more information to be conveyed to investors. With more information available, the issue is
scrutinized to a greater degree and the need for underpricing is lower. The negative coefficient
on NMGR in Table V suggests that the same relationship exists in post-bankruptcy equity
offerings. That is, the higher the number of firms participating in the underwriting process, the
lower is the underpricing.
The coefficient of the variable P is positive and statistically significant. P represents
the adjustment in offer price as the underwriter obtains new information about the equity
offering. The coefficient on the HOT variable is positive and significant at the 5 percent level.
This result suggests a higher level of underpricing during the hot period, which is consistent
with the findings of Ljungqvist and Wilhem (2003)
D.
Long-run Stock Price Performance
In Table VI, we present the results of BHARs up to 36 months following the equity
offering. In Table VI, a matching firm is one closest in size and book-to-market, to the sample
firm. BHARs are calculated for various intervals in months. A month is defined as 21
consecutive trading days. The first day starts the following day of the issue.
The t-tests of the mean BHARs are significant for the following holding periods: 1
month, 3 months, 6 months, 12 months and 24 months. The mean BHARs are all positive. The
sign tests are significant for the 1-, 6- and 12-month(s) holding periods. The Wilcoxon signed
rank tests are significant for the 1-, 3-, 6- and 12-month(s) periods. The results imply that postbankruptcy equity offerings outperform matching firms closest in size and book-to-market.
In Table VII, we calculate the BHARs using a different set of matching firms, whereby
a matching firm is one that operates in the same industry as and is closest in size to the equityoffering firm. The t-tests of the mean BHARs are significant for the 1-, 3- and 36-month(s)
holding periods. The Wilcoxon signed rank tests yield similar results. Only the 1-month and
36-months BHARs are significant using the sign test.
Results from Tables VI and VII contrast sharply with the findings of IPO long-run
abnormal returns. Ritter (1991) and Loughran and Ritter (1995) document significant negative
long-run abnormal returns of IPOs. In contrast to traditional IPOs that are completely new to
the market, post-bankruptcy equity offerings are conducted by firms that were once publicly
traded. Hence, there exists less information asymmetry with post-bankruptcy equity offerings
than with traditional IPOs. That may explain why the long-run performance of post-bankruptcy
equity offerings differs markedly from that of traditional IPOs.
We also use the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model to calculate long-run
abnormal returns post-issuance. Results are presented in Table VIII. The intercept represents
the mean abnormal return in the one year following the issue. The year begins one day after the
issue. The market-, size and book-to-market-factors are all significant at the 1 percent level.
The intercept is not significantly different from zero. There is no evidence of abnormal longterm share price performance in the year following the post-bankruptcy equity offering. These
results are consistent with the one-year BHAR reported in Table VII, and differ from results
reported by Ritter (1991) and Loughran and Ritter (1995).
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E.
Risk profile of post-bankruptcy equity offerings
Even if the sample firms that engage in equity offerings have low underpricing, it is
possible that they experience volatile stock price movements over time. These firms went
bankrupt in the past, so any minor hint of weakness could trigger investor concerns. Thus, the
risk of firms that engage in public stock offerings after emerging from bankruptcy could be
unusually high. We compare the aftermarket risk characteristics of equity offerings by firms
that emerged from bankruptcy with: (i) matching IPO firms matched by offer year and size of
the issue and (ii) matching IPO firms matched by offer year, industry and size of the issue. Risk
is measured as the standard deviation of daily returns over the year following the equity
offering. Results are presented in Table IX.
The average of the standard deviation of daily returns over the year following the issue
is 2.87 percent for the sample firms that engage in a public stock offering after emerging from
bankruptcy (see Panel A of Table IX). The average standard deviation for matching IPO firms
matched on offer year and size of the issue is 3.71 percent. The average standard deviation for
matching IPO firms matched on offer year, industry and size of the issue is 3.64 percent.
In Panel B of Table IX, we compare the average of the standard deviations of postbankruptcy equity offerings with the benchmarks. Matching IPO firms matched on offer year
and size of the issue have a significantly higher standard deviation than equity offerings by
firms emerging from bankruptcy. The difference in the mean standard deviations is significant
at the 1 percent level. Thus, the aftermarket risk as measured by stock volatility in the first year
is lower for equity offerings by firms emerging from bankruptcy than for traditional IPOs.
V.

Conclusion
When a firm goes bankrupt, entrepreneurship is necessary to restructure it into a new
business and to finance its operations. We examine the underpricing and long-run equity
performance of equity offerings by firms that emerge from bankruptcy. We hypothesize that
uncertainty about the value of such an offering is substantially reduced because of the
availability of public information prior to the offering. First, such firms previously had publicly
traded securities and were subject to the SEC disclosure requirements. Second, the dynamics of
U.S. bankruptcy proceedings provide information to the investing public regarding several
aspects of the firm‟s assets, liabilities, and governance. Hence, there is substantially more
information available to investors to assess their valuations after they emerged from
bankruptcy.
The mean underpricing of the firms that engaged in public stock offerings after
emerging from bankruptcy is 4.49 percent, while the mean underpricing for the traditional IPOs
is 15.53 percent. This difference in underpricing is statistically significant at the 1 percent level,
which supports our hypothesis. A multivariate analysis that controls for other characteristics
that could affect the level of underpricing reinforces our findings.
We also assess the long-term stock price performance following public offerings by
firms emerging from bankruptcy. The mean BHARs are positive for all holding periods, and
significant for selected holding periods. The results imply that post-bankruptcy equity offerings
outperform matching firms. These results contrast sharply with the findings of IPO long-run
abnormal returns by Ritter (1991), Loughran and Ritter (1995), and others. We attribute the
difference to the lower degree of information asymmetry of firms that engage in public stock
offerings after emerging from bankruptcy. Since there is less hype and underpricing associated
with these offerings, there is less potential for an aftermarket correction. We also find that the
aftermarket risk of public offerings by firms emerging from bankruptcy is lower than that of
traditional IPOs.
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Table I
Panel A
Distribution of post-bankruptcy equity
offerings by year
Year
n
%
1986
1
2%
1987
1
2%
1990
4
6%
1991
2
3%
1992
4
6%
1993
5
8%
1994
6
9%
1995
2
3%
1996
9
14%
1997
1
2%
1998
2
3%
1999
1
2%
2000
1
2%
2001
1
2%
2003
4
6%
2004
13
20%
2005
9
14%
66
100%
Panel B
Distribution of post-bankruptcy equity
offerings by stock exchange
Exchange
n
%
AMEX
5
8%
NASDAQ
23
35%
NYSE
38
58%
66
100%
(Continued)
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Table I
(continued)
Panel C
Distribution of Post-Bankruptcy Equity Offerings by use of
proceeds
Use of Proceeds
n
%
Acquisition Fin.
4
6%
General Corp. Purposes
19
29%
Pay on LT Borrowings
1
2%
Payment on Borrowings
3
5%
Proceed to Shareholders
1
2%
Project Finance
1
2%
Recapitalization
1
2%
Reduce Indebtedness
1
2%
Refinancing /Retiring Acquisition related Debt
1
2%
Refinancing /Retiring Bank Debt
4
6%
Refinancing /Retiring Fixed Income Debt
3
5%
Refinancing
1
2%
Secondary
15
23%
Working Capital
2
3%
Unknown
9
14%
66
100%
(continued)
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Table I
(continued)
Panel D
Distribution of post-bankruptcy equity offerings by industry
Industry
Air Transportation, Scheduled
Air-Cond & Warm Air Heatg Equip & Common & Indl Refrig Equip
Cement, Hydraulic
Communications Services, NEC
Computer Storage Devices
Crude Petroleum & Natural Gas
Deep Sea & Foreign Transportation of Freight
Drawing & Insulating of Nonferrous Wire
Drilling Oil & Gas Wells
Fabricated Structural Metal Products
Fire, Marine & Casualty Insurance
Glass Containers
Hospital & Medical Service Plans
Hotels & Motels
Jewelry, Precious Metal
Life Insurance
Local & Suburban Transit & Interurban Hway Passenger Trans
Meat Packing Plants
Metal Forgings & Stampings
Mining Machinery & Equip (No Oil & Gas Field Mach & Equip)
Motor Vehicle Parts & Accessories
Natural Gas Transmission & Distribution
Oil & Gas Field Machinery & Equipment
Oil & Gas Field Services, NEC
Operative Builders
Pharmaceutical Preparations
Printing Trades Machinery & Equipment
Retail-Department Stores
Retail-Grocery Stores
Retail-Variety Stores
Sausages & Other Prepared Meat Products
Services - General Medical & Surgical Hospitals (NEC)
Services - Miscellaneous Business Services
Services - Motion Picture Theaters
Services-Skilled Nursing Care Facilities
Steel Works, Blast Furnaces & Rolling Mills (Coke Ovens)
Telephone Communications (No Radiotelephone)
Wood Household Furniture, (No Upholstered)
(continued)

n
6
1
2
3
3
1
1
1
3
3
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
1
2
2
1
1
2
1
1
3
1
2
1
1
1
2
1
2
1
3
1
3
66

%
9%
2%
3%
5%
5%
2%
2%
2%
5%
5%
2%
2%
2%
2%
3%
2%
3%
2%
3%
3%
2%
2%
3%
2%
2%
5%
2%
3%
2%
2%
2%
3%
2%
3%
2%
5%
2%
5%
100%
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Table I
(continued)
Panel E
Distribution of lead underwriters in post-bankruptcy equity offerings
Lead Managers
n
%
Alex Brown & Sons Inc
1
1%
BA Securities Inc
1
1%
Banc of America Securities LLC
1
1%
Bear Stearns & Co Inc
4
5%
Citigroup
2
2%
Credit Suisse First Boston Corp
3
4%
CS First Boston Corp
2
2%
DA Davidson & Co Inc
1
1%
Deutsche Bank Securities Corp.
1
1%
First Boston Corp
1
1%
Goldman Sachs & Co
13
15%
Jefferies & Co Inc
1
1%
JP Morgan & Co Inc
3
4%
Lehman Brothers
4
5%
MDB Capital Corp
1
1%
Merrill Lynch & Co Inc
12
14%
Morgan Keegan Inc
1
1%
Morgan Stanley
1
1%
Salomon Brothers Inc
11
13%
Sanders Morris Harris Inc
1
1%
Smith Barney Incorporated
4
5%
Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co
2
2%
Stephens Inc
2
2%
UBS Investment Bank
5
6%
US Bancorp Piper Jaffray Inc
1
1%
Wertheim Schroder & Co (UK)
1
1%
Panel F
Syndicated versus non-syndicated post-bankruptcy equity
offerings
Syndicated
n
%
No
18
27%
Yes
48
73%
66
100%
Panel G
Distribution of post-bankruptcy equity offerings by lock-up
provisions
Lock-up Provision
n
%
No
28
42%
Yes
38
58%
66
100%
The sample of post-bankruptcy equity offerings are from the SDC Global New Issues database from 1986 to 2005. Details of the sample are as
reported in SDC. Bankrupt firms are identified in Lynn LoPucki‟s Bankruptcy Research Database.

The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance & Business Ventures, Vol. 12, Iss. 2

17

Table II
Summary statistics of characteristics of post-bankruptcy equity offerings
n Mean
Median
Std Dev
Minimum
Maximum
Duration (Year)
66
1.75
1.41
1.39
0.08
6.86
Number of years from Ch. 11
emergence to offer
66
3.48
2.20
3.53
0.03
16.80
Offer Price (US$)
66
18.97
16.38
12.87
1.00
69.00
Proceeds (US$ Mil)
66
151.47
105.95
199.52
12.50
1428.00
Overallotment amount sold as a % of
amount offered
66
7.89
9.39
6.86
0.00
15.00
Number of lead, co-lead & comanagers
66
3.09
3.00
1.70
1.00
9.00
Percent change mid-file price to offer
price
66
0.04
-0.02
0.44
-0.49
3.06
Percent gross spread
56
0.05
0.06
0.01
0.01
0.08
Average lead underwriter(s) rating
60
8.58
9.00
0.88
4.86
9.00
The sample of post-bankruptcy equity offerings are from the SDC Global New Issues database from 1986 to 2005.
Bankrupt firms are identified in Lynn LoPucki‟s Bankruptcy Research Database. Related statistics are collected
either from SDC or Bankruptcy Research Database.

Table III
First-day underpricing of post-bankruptcy equity offerings
n
Mean
Median
t value POS:NEG
Sign M
Signed Rank S
66
4.49%
1.74%
4.43***
16:50
22.5
673
(p<0.0001)
(p<0.0001)
(p<0.0001)
The sample of post-bankruptcy equity offerings are from the SDC Global New Issues database from 1986 to 2005. Bankrupt
firms are identified in Lynn LoPucki‟s Bankruptcy Research Database. OFFER TO CLOSE is the difference between the
offer price and the closing price on the day of the offer. Offer prices are collected from SDC. Trading prices are collected
from CRSP. All tests examine whether the sample mean significantly differs from zero.
***
denotes significance at the 0.01 level.
**
denotes significance at the 0.05 level.
*
denotes significance at the 0.10 level.
Underpricing
OFFER TO CLOSE
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Table IV
Comparison of the underpricing of post-bankruptcy equity offerings to traditional IPOs
Panel A
Underpricing of:
n
Mean
Median
t value
Post-bankruptcy equity offerings
66
4.49%
1.74%
4.43***
(p<0.0001)
Matching traditional IPOs
66
15.53%
7.04%
6.54***
(p<0.0001)
Difference
66
11.03%
5.30%
4.25***
(p<0.0001)

Underpricing of:
Post-bankruptcy equity offerings

Panel B
n
Mean
66
4.49%

Median
1.74%

t value
4.43***
(p<0.0001)
Matching traditional IPOs
66
15.80%
5.21%
4.31***
(p<0.0001)
Difference
66
11.31%
3.47%
2.94***
(p=0.0046)
This table compares the underpricing of post-bankruptcy equity offerings with traditional IPOs. In
Panel A, the traditional IPO is a matching firm that conducted an equity offering in the same year as the
corresponding sample firm and in the same industry. In Panel B, the traditional IPO is a matching firm
that conducted an equity offering in the same year as the corresponding sample firm and is closest in
size to the sample firm. The sample of post-bankruptcy equity offerings and matching traditional IPOs
are from the SDC Global New Issues database from 1986 to 2005. Bankrupt firms are identified in
Lynn LoPucki‟s Bankruptcy Research Database. Underpricing is measured as the difference between
the offer price and the closing price on the day of the offer. Offer prices are collected from SDC.
Trading prices are collected from CRSP.
***
denotes significance at the 0.01 level.
**
denotes significance at the 0.05 level.
*
denotes significance at the 0.10 level.
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Table V
Cross-sectional analysis of underpricing
Variables
Estimate
t Value
Pr > |t|
0.1660
5.870***
<.0001
Intercept
***
-0.0903
-3.640
0.0004
BANKRUPT
0.0362
0.480
0.6312
OVERPCT
-0.0133
-1.800*
0.0744
NMGR
0.0657
1.820*
0.0704
P
**
0.1606
2.260
0.0253
HOT
n
132
R-square
0.1786
F
5.48
Pr > F
0.0001
The sample of 66 post-bankruptcy equity offerings and their matching original IPOs is from
the SDC Global New Issues database from 1986 to 2005. A matched original IPO is a
matching firm that conducted an IPO in the same year as its corresponding sample firm and
is in the same industry and closest in size to the sample firm. Bankrupt firms are identified
in Lynn LoPucki‟s Bankruptcy Research Database. The dependent variable is
UNDERPRICING and is measured as the difference between the offer price and the closing
price on the day of the offer. The independent variables are: (i) a dummy variable to
indicate that the equity offering is conducted by a previously bankrupt firm (BANKRUPT),
(ii) the over-allotment amount sold as a percentage of the deal value (OVERPCT); (iii) the
number of firms participating in the underwriting process (NMGR); (iv) the percentage
change from the middle of the original price and the offer price (P); and, (v) the hot
period (HOT). Robust standard errors for OLS regression parameter estimates are used.
***
denotes significance at the 0.01 level.
**
denotes significance at the 0.05 level.
*
denotes significance at the 0.10 level.
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Table VI
Buy and hold abnormal returns of post-bankruptcy equity offerings
n
Mean
Median
t value POS:NEG
Sign M
Signed Rank S
BHAR 1 MONTH
65
5.10%
3.60%
2.94***
42:23
9.50**
417.50***
(0.0046)
(0.0248)
(0.0054)
BHAR 3 MONTHS
62
11.20%
5.04%
2.83***
37:25
6.00
342.50**
(0.0063)
(0.1619)
(0.0151)
BHAR 6 MONTHS
58
11.73%
9.91%
2.22**
37:21
8.00**
298.50**
(0.0305)
(0.0479)
(0.0195)
BHAR 12 MONTHS
55
18.55%
21.42%
2.10**
36:19
8.50**
263.00**
(0.0403)
(0.0300)
(0.0262)
BHAR 24 MONTHS
38
33.47%
20.35%
1.98*
22:16
3.00
91.50
(0.0558)
(0.4177)
(0.1882)
BHAR 36 MONTHS
32
12.88%
42.31%
0.39
17:15
1.00
24.00
(0.7020)
(0.8601)
(0.6608)
This table shows the Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs) of post-bankruptcy equity offerings. A BHAR is simply a
holding period return on the sample firm less the holding period return on a matching firm. For each sample firm, the
matching firm is the one closest in size and book-to-market, respectively. Both stock prices and the number of shares
outstanding are collected from CRSP. A firm‟s book-to-market ratio is calculated as the ratio of the book value of common
equity (COMPUSTAT data item 60) divided by the market value of equity. The sample of post-bankruptcy equity offerings
are from the SDC Global New Issues database from 1986 to 2005. Bankrupt firms are identified in Lynn LoPucki‟s
Bankruptcy Research Database.
***
denotes significance at the 0.01 level.
**
denotes significance at the 0.05 level.
*
denotes significance at the 0.10 level.
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Table VII
Buy and hold abnormal returns of post-bankruptcy equity offerings
n
Mean
Median
t value POS:NEG
Sign M
Signed Rank S
BHAR 1 MONTH
65
5.53%
5.07%
3.25***
45:20
12.50***
446.50***
(0.0018)
(0.0026)
(0.0028)
BHAR 3 MONTHS
62
8.15%
4.78%
1.98*
35:27
4.00
236.50*
(0.0519)
(0.3742)
(0.0976)
BHAR 6 MONTHS
58
7.21%
-1.05%
1.28
28:30
-1.00
160.50
(0.2062)
(0.8957)
(0.2169)
BHAR 12 MONTHS
55
13.52%
14.21%
1.53
32:23
4.50
155.00
(0.1310)
(0.2806)
(0.1967)
BHAR 24 MONTHS
38
23.00%
-2.73%
1.48
17:21
-2.00
48.50
(0.1466)
(0.6271)
(0.4892)
BHAR 36 MONTHS
32
48.64%
25.08%
2.16**
23:9
7.00**
130.00**
(0.0383)
(0.0201)
(0.0126)
This table shows the Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs) of post-bankruptcy equity offerings. A BHAR is simply a
holding period return on the sample firm less the holding period return on a matching firm. For each sample firm, the
matching firm is the one closest in size with the same SIC code as the sample firm. Size is calculated as the stock price times
the number of shares outstanding. Both stock prices and the number of shares outstanding are collected from CRSP. The
sample of post-bankruptcy equity offerings are from the SDC Global New Issues database from 1986 to 2005. Bankrupt
firms are identified in Lynn LoPucki‟s Bankruptcy Research Database.
***
denotes significance at the 0.01 level.
**
denotes significance at the 0.05 level.
*
denotes significance at the 0.10 level.

Table VIII
Long-run abnormal returns using Fama-French calendar-time model
Heteroscedasticity
Estimate OLS t value
consistent t value
Intercept (Abnormal Return)
-0.0003
-0.52
-0.52
b(p)
1.4275
19.15
***
14.63
***
s(p)
0.6353
6.29
***
3.49
***
h(p)
1.1771
8.65
***
5.77
***
R-squared
0.0921
This table shows the results from applying the three-factor model as developed by Fama and French
(1993). The three-factor model is applied by regressing the 253 post-event daily excess returns for firm i
on a market factor [b(p)], a size factor [s(p)], and a book-to-market factor [h(p)] as explained in Fama and
French (1993). To calculate the excess return, the three-month Treasury Bills are used. The intercept
represents the mean daily abnormal return over the 253 days starting one day after the equity offering for
the sample of 66 post-bankruptcy equity offerings.
***
denotes significance at the 0.01 level.
**
denotes significance at the 0.05 level.
*
denotes significance at the 0.10 level.
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Table IX
Comparison of post-issuance risk profile of post-bankruptcy equity offering to alternative benchmarks
Panel A
The standard deviations of daily returns of:
n
Mean
Median
t Value Pr > |t|
Post-bankruptcy equity offerings (PBEO)
66
2.87% 2.69%***
16.14 <.0001
IPOs matched by size
66
3.71% 2.99%***
12.04 <.0001
IPOs matched by industry and size
66
3.64% 3.54%***
24.07 <.0001
CRSP Value Weighted Market Index
66
0.74% 0.68%***
22.00 <.0001
CRSP Equally Weighted Market Index
66
0.60% 0.57%***
24.56 <.0001
Panel B
The differences in standard deviations of daily
returns of:
PBEO – IPOs matched by size

n
66

Mean
-0.84%

Median
-0.63%

t Value
Sign M Signed Rank S
-4.15
-15
-622.5
(<.0001) (0.0003)
(<.0001)
PBEO – IPOs matched by industry and size
66
-0.77%
-0.94%
-3.64
-14
-640.5
(0.0005) (0.0008)
(<.0001)
PBEO – CRSP Value Weighted Market Index
66
2.13%
1.86%
13.13
33
1105.5
(<.0001) (<.0001)
(<.0001)
PBEO – CRSP Equally Weighted Market Index
66
2.27%
2.00%
13.54
33
1105.5
(<.0001) (<.0001)
(<.0001)
This table shows the risk profile of post-bankruptcy equity offerings and benchmarks over the 252 days starting 1 day after the
issue. Risk is measured as the standard deviation of the daily returns. Returns data are collected from CRSP. The first benchmark
consists of IPOs matched by offer year and size. The second benchmark consists of IPOs matched by offer year, SIC codes and
size. The third benchmark is the CRSP Value Weighted Market Index. The fourth benchmark is the CRSP Equally Weighted
Market Index.
*** denotes significance at the 0.01 level.
** denotes significance at the 0.05 level.
* denotes significance at the 0.10 level.

